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CARDIAC VICTIMS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Terry v. Associated Stone Co.,'
recently awarded compensation to a claimant who suffered a coronary
occlusion with resulting damage to his heart following strenuous
exertion arising out of and in the course of his employment. The
court, prior to this time, had never compensated for a disabling heart
attack resulting from a pre-existing disease which had possibly been
superinduced by excitement, exertion, stress or strain.2 It is noteworthy, however, that the Workmen's Compensation Board has consistently declined to award compensation for either death or disability in heart cases and the Court of Appeals has, with one exception,3 uniformly sustained the findings of the Board. In the Terry case
the Court of Appeals again sustained the findings of the Board (except
for the amount of the award) and to this extent nothing revolutionary
appears in the case.
In sustaining the award of compensation by the Workmen's Compensation Board in the Terry case the court broke away from what
seemed to be an inseverable gravitational pull of conservatism and
took a more liberal interpretation of the accident requirement in the
statute in a heart case. 3 a One cannot, however, too hastily assume
1 Terry v. Associated Stone Co., 334 S.W. 2d 926 (Ky. 1960).

2 Id. at 928 and cases cited therein. But see Adams v. Bryant, 274 S.W. 2d
791 (Ky. 1955), where the attending physician listed acute cardiac failure as one
of three possible causes of the employee's death. The court recognized the
absence of disease and awarded compensation for overexertion, nervous shock
and exposure.
3 The lone exception is Wallins Creek Collieries Co. v. Williams, 211 Ky. 200
277 S.W. 234 (1925). In that case the court stated that the Board did not find
that death was the result of pre-existing heart disease "but there was no evidence
upon which it could base any other finding, and its conclusion to the contrary is
" 211 Ky. at 202, 277 S.W. at 235. [Emphasis
not supported by any evidence ..
added.]
3a Most of the heart cases that have reached the Kentucky Court of Appeals
have been decided on the basis of the "substantial evidence" rule. However, the
conservative attitude of the court is indicated by expressions in three cases, in
one of which it would seem that the holding was contrary to the holding in the
Term case. In Rusch v. Louisville Water Co., 193 Ky. 698, 237 S.W. 389
(1922), the Board had found that the death had two causes, namely, (a) "preexisting heart disease" and (b) "over excitement and hurry at a critical moment."
The Board then found (c) that the claimant had not sustained the burden of
proof that the death "was not the result of pre-existing disease" and dismissed the
claim. Since finding (b) conflicts with finding (c), the court should have
returned the case to the Board for clarification of the findings, unless the dismissal
of the claim could be justified on other grounds. It should be clear that, if "over
excitement and hurry at a critical moment," contributing to death, could be
classified as an accident, the claimant should have been entitled to an award
apportioned among the two causes. It follows that the claim is a holding that
such was not an accident within the meaning of the statute. This conclusion is
born out by the language used by the court. Thus, the court has in the Rusch
vase, in effect, adopted the conservative view that, in heart cases, there is not
(fpotnote continued on next page)
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that the Gordian knot has been cut for heart claimants in Kentucky.
The court indicated that with the addition of the word "traumatic"
preceding the words "personal injury" to the statute subsequent to
the accident in question, this decision would not necessarily control
cases arising after the amendment. 4 This paper proposes to show
that this latest liberal view of the court in Kentucky is the preferable
view. Also, in spite of or notwithstanding the addition of the word
"traumatic" to the statute, the Workmen's Compensation Board and
the Kentucky Court of Appeals should not retreat from this forwardlooking position.
"Among industrial workers under 65 who develop coronary thrombosis, less than 25 per cent need retire. The majority are able to carry
on the old routine if they are not subjected to stress, overexertion,
long hours and too little leisure."6 However there is a certain stigma,
attaching to one who has had any type of heart disease, which is a social
and economic disability. A person who has a heart condition or has
had one aggravated by injury is faced with the problem that in our
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

an accident unless there is an unexpected cause, as distinguished from unexpectedness of result only, for there was here clearly an unexpected result. See
Wieda v. American Box Board Co., 343 Mich. 182, 72 N.W. 2d 18 (1955). In
Wallins Creek Collieries Co. v. Williams, 211 Ky. 200, 277 S.W. 234 (1925), the
Board found that the death was caused by an accident, on evidence that death
was caused by an attack of angina pectoris, a chronic condition of the blood
vessels feeding the heart, which attack "was perhaps superinduced by overexertion." The Board awarded full compensation and the circuit court affirmed.
Since there was no apportionment the Board and the circuit court must have
considered that the death was accidental and its sole cause was the overexertion, the pre-existing disease not having been a contributing factor. The Court
of Appeals appears to have treated the case as one in which two causes contributed to the death, viz., (a) the pre-existing chronic diseased condition of the
heart, and (b) the attack of angina pectoris (a disease), "perhaps superinduced
by the overexertion." The former could not have been considered as basis for an
award in any event and the latter could not have been so considered unless it
had been "the natural and direct result of a traumatic injury by accident."
[Emphasis added] 1918 Ky. Acts ch. 176, p. 690 (1918). The court said that
"what happened ... was certainly not a traumatic accident ... " Therefore there
was no basis for an award. 211 Ky. at 203-04, 277 S.W. at 235. The court by
way of dictum expressed the opinion that what happened could not be classified as
an accident. It is clear that the court relied on Rusch, supra. In Salmon v.
Armco Steel Corp., 275 S.W. 2d 590. 592 (Ky. 1955) the court stated: "However,
in a number of cases we have held that a heart attack brought on by strain or
exertion is not compensable."
4 Terry v. Associated Stone Co., 334 S.W. 2d 926. 930 (Ky. 1960). "As of
August 1, 1956, Kv. Rev. Stat. (hereinafter cited KRS) §842.005(1) (1960)
was amended by addition of the word "traumatic proceeding [sic] the words
'personal injury.' Appellant's injury occurred in July of 1955. Therefore, whether
the law as it now reads would indicate any different result under the facts of this
case is unnecessary to decide."
65 KRS 342.005(1); see Ky. Acts 1956 ch. 77 § 1.
Osbom, "Placing the Cardiac in Industry," The Heart: A Law-Medicine
Problem (An Institute of The Law-Medicine Center, Western Reserve University,
March 22-23, 1957), at 274, quoting from an article by Dr. T. R. Van Dellen
which appeared in the Houston Chronicle on September 20, 1956.
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dynamic society of competitive production cardiac cripples are not
wanted in the open labor market.7 This presents a limitation to which
the person with a heart disability must adapt himself and avoid
psychological reactions while doing so. 8
The underlying philosophies, opposed to recognition of disabilities
and deaths from heart diseases, seem to be based on an assumption
that such recognition is social insurance. There are probably two
reasons for this: (a) cardiovascular diseases account for over half of
all deaths in the United States, 9 and (b) cardiovascular deaths may
occur at night when the person is in bed completely at rest as often
as they occur while the person is at work. This seems to have established a presumption that heart disease is ordinarily the result of
natural physiological causes rather than trauma or particular effort.' 0
Workmen's compensation acts in the United States are not intended
to provide public social insurance"' nor would this be a desirable goal.
The fact that such a large proportion of deaths occur from cardiovascular diseases only demonstrates the social and economic magnitude
of the problem. It is not a sound argument against compensation.
It may be granted that a large number of these cardiovascular
deaths may occur when the person is at complete rest as compared
with the number that occur when the person is on the job. However,
there is still the requirement that the death or disability be sustained
12
by an accident "arising out of and in the course of his employment"
which must be satisfied in order for the Board to award compensation.
In support of a more liberal view as to heart cases there are several
arguments. Foremost is the statutory directive. In Kentucky the
7 Id. at 275, stating that when it comes to hiring new employees who have
heart trouble, they are accepted by some firms but over half never or only
occasionally hire cardiacs. In contrast, however, up to 88 per cent of companies
retain persons who develop heart disease.
8 See, "Social Disability of the Cardiac Cripple: Economic and Emotional
Consequences of Traumatic Heart Disease," 5 Current Med. No. 20, p. 17 (May
1958).
9 Cardiovascular Diseases in the U. S.-Facts and Figures, pp. 1 and 10
(March 1958), showing that the ratio of cardiovascular deaths to all deaths in
the United States has risen from 24% in 1905 to 53.8% in 1955. This is an
American Heart Association pamphlet available through the Kentucky Heart
Association, Inc., 311 Speed Building, Louisville 2, Kentucky.
10 See, Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 13 N. J.Super. 56, 80 A. 2d 235, 236
(1951), cert. granted, 7 N.J. 578, 83 A. 2d 379 (1951), rev'd, 8 N. J.586, 86 A. 2d
577 (1952), aff'd on reargument, 10 N. J. 325, 91 A. 2d 569 (1952); Mills v.
Monte Christi Corp., 10 N.J. Super. 162, 76 A. 2d 839 (1950), cert. denied, 6
N. J.315, 78 A. 2d 738 (1951); Lohndorf v. Peper Bros. Paint Co., 134 N.J.L.
156, 46 A. 2d 439 (1946).
11 See 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 3.10 (1952) and materials
there referred to comparing our American systems with those of New Zealand
and Great Britain which are truly public and socialistic.
12 KRS 342.005(1). 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 11, § 6.10, notes that fortyone (41) states and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act have adopted
this provision,
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workmen's compensation statute specifically provides that the statute

"shall be liberally construed on questions of law, as distinguished
from evidence...." 1 3 At the outset the Board must find as fact what
was the cause of the disability or death, and its finding on this is conclusive on the court if supported by substantial evidence, 14 whether
on disputed or undisputed testimony. Then the Board must determine
whether the cause so found was a "personal injury by accident."
This determination is one of law reviewable by the court,' 5 but our
court has frequently ignored the distinction between these two mental
processes treating the total determination as one of fact.lsa Thus

if the Workmen's Compensation Board determines, on the basis of
conflicting probative evidence which is substantial, that a death or
disability is compensable, the Court of Appeals can be expected to
continue affirming the Board's decisions. 16 In either case, the Workmen's Compensation Board, or the courts are further directed to
liberally construe the statutes "with a view to promote their objects
"17
and carry out the intent of the legislature ...
What was the intent or purpose of the legislature in enacting the

Workmen's Compensation Act? Apparently it was the intention of
the Kentucky legislature "to place the burden for injuries received
upon the industries in which they were suffered rather than upon a
society as a whole."' 8 Something very similar to this statement of
intent is the usual statement of the purpose for workmen's compensation statutes generally. 19 A rather cursory dismissal of cases involving
heart disease will defeat this intent. In fact, in some occupations, such
as that of traveling salesmen, taxi drivers, bus drivers and truck
drivers for example,2 0 future medical research may determine that the
13

KRS 342.004.

14 This "substantial evidence" must be more than a scintilla and must do
more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. American Rolling Mill Co. v. Pack, 278 Ky. 175, 181-182, 128 S.W. 2d 187, 190 (1939).
15 For numerous authorities see, 19 Ky. Dig., "Workmen's Compensation,
Key No. 1939.
15a See Brewer v. Millich, 276 S.W. 2d 12 (Ky. 1955) where the distinction
was recognized but the court treated the determination as one of law in Hayes
Freight Lines v. Bums, 290 S.W. 2d 836 (Ky. 1956).
1' Terry v. Associated Stone Co., 334 S.W. 2d 926, 929 (Ky. 1960). The
court noted that in Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Whitaker, 303 Ky. 716, 198 S.W. 2d
792 (1947), the opinion indicated that the court would have sustained the findings
of the Board regardless of the way the Board had interpreted the evidence before
them.
17 KRS 446.080(1).
18 Robinson v. Lytle, 276 Ky. 397, 124 S.W. 2d 78, 80 (1938) and Brewer v.
Millich, 276 S.W. 2d 12, 16 (Ky. 1955).
19 1 Larson. op. cit. supra note 11, § 1.00. See also e.g., the editor's formulation of 99 0.J.5. Workmen's Compensation § 5a (1958).
20
survey indicates that people who drive cars for a living tend to have a
much higher heart disease rate than those who do not. Mills and Porter,
(footnote continued on next page)
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industry is not carrying its share of heart disease disabilities. As
medical knowledge of this fact develops, heart disabilities may be
determined to be occupational diseases in these fields. This paper,
however, is not prepared to propose such an extension for heart
disease disabilities upon the present level of knowledge of the causes
of heart injuries.
Assuming at this point that Kentucky will develop a liberal
interpretation of the statute in this respect and that heart disease
disabilities and deaths were intended to be compensable under our
Workmen's Compensation Act, can heart claimants satisfy the several
tests for compensation in Kentucky? KRS 842.005(1)21 makes the
employer liable for;
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

traumatic
personal injury sustained by the employe
by accident
and for disability resulting from occupational disease
22
arising out of and
23
in the course of his employment,
or for death resulting from such accidental injury or occupational disease,

but specifically excluding;
(h) diseases except where the disease is the natural and direct
result of a traumatic injury by accident and
(i) results of a pre-existing disease, whether previously disabling
or not.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

"Tobacco Smoking and Automobile-Driving Stress in Relation to Deaths from
Cardiac and Vascular Causes," 234 Am. J. M. Sc. 35-43 (July 1957). It
was found in this study that heart disease is distinctly higher in persons with an
annual driving mileage in excess of 12,000 miles. In this study it was noted that
excessive cigarette smoking and an annual driving mileage in excess of 12,000
miles are related to an increased amount of deaths due to heart disease.
The significance of this study lies in the fact that tobacco smoking and
automobile driving are increasing. According to this work, this would mean a
possible increase in frequency of medicolegal issues of traumatic heart disease
when drivers are involved in automobile accidents.
The implications of this study may be far reaching. This is evidence that
workers who were drivers by "occupation" could have heart conditions which
arose out of employment" even though the actual heart attack did not occur on
the job
21 at all. 5 Current Med. No. 20, p. 16 (May 1958).
Ky. Acts 1960, Ch. 147 § 1.
22 See generally, Note, "Workmen's Compensation-Arising Out of and In
The Course Of Employment," 47 Ky. L.J. 429 (1959), for a discussion of the
"arising out of" requirement in Kentucky.
23 See generally Note, "Workmen's Compensation-The 'Going and Coming'
Rule and Its Exceptions in Kentucky," 47 Ky. L.J. 420 (1959), for a discussion
of the "in the course of' phrase in Kentucky.
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We are interested at this point in the possible or probable effect of
the addition to this section of the word "traumatic" preceding the
words "personal injury." What has this word added to the accidental
injury requirement?
There is a considerable diversity of opinion as to the meaning of
the word "traumatic." This term is not always understood to have a
uniform meaning as between lawyers and even less often as between
lawyers and doctors. The criterion for "trauma" under the decisions
of the Kentucky Court of Appeals would apparently include "any
independent influence or causes external to the body coming into
direct contact with, and causing injury to, the physical structures
thereof."24 For the purposes of this article, this definition will be
accepted. This definition is broad enough for "trauma" to include four
categories: (1) Physical trauma, caused by physical violence; (2)
Thermal trauma, caused by heat or cold; (3) Electrical trauma,
25
caused by electrical energy; (4) Chemical trauma, caused by poisons.
In heart cases there is not only the difficulty implicit in the
definition of the word "trauma" itself but also the difficulty in proof
of causation. At times it may not be possible to get adequate medical
testimony to prove causation in all cases.2 6 However, because of the
importance of heart disease as a medicolegal problem27 the medical
profession is paying more attention to the influence of stress and strain
as a substantial factor in heart disease. Stress and strain can be
physical, such as is experienced in accidental injury or it can be
psychological or emotional as is experienced by executives who have
to make serious decisions. Either of these is now considered of
sufficient importance in heart disease for prominent medical authorities to go on record in this regard in a positive manner.28 When death
24

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 271, 46 S.W. 2d

87, 89 (1932). See also Note, "Traumatic Personal Injury: A Discussion of the
1956 Amendment to the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act," 47 Ky. L.J.
437 (1959). This article advocates extension of the definition of "trauma to
include overexertion, shock and overexposure.
25 Gonzales, Vance, Helpern, Legal Medicine and Toxicology, at 88 (1954),
cited in Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 284 N.C. 126, 66 S.E.2d 693,
696 2(1951).
0
Vaccaro v. Marra Bros., 130 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
2
7

Statistical Bulletin, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., (Dec. 1955), estimated that 5V2 million people in this country have some type of heart disease.
There are 11/ million new cases each year. This is important in the personal
injury field in that inevitably people with heart disease may be involved in
traumatic situations which give rise to the disputed issue of traumatic heart
disease. 3 Current Med. No. 14, p. 8 (Nov. 1956).
28 Trauma as a Type of Stress in the Causation of Coronary Heart Disease:
A Symposium Review of Recent Medical Literature on the Subject," 5 Current

Med. No. 20, p. 10 (May 1958). For other medical authorities' views on the
relationship of coronary heart disease and physical exertion, accidental trauma
(footnote continued on next page)
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or disability follows an accident arising out of and in the course of
the claimant's employment, the medicolegal question usually is, "Was
the disability or death the result of the accident alone, the heart
disease alone, or did both contribute in the subsequent disability?" 20
The most clear-cut means of heart injury would be through
penetrating wounds as, e.g., bullets, knives or broken ribs. This type
of injury would offer no problem as there would be direct physical
trauma. From this extreme and obvious example we move toward
the cases that produce litigation in which the accident requirement
is not so clearly met. Larson30 groups by-accident requirement cases
into four principal categories, consisting of two "exertion" categories
-- 'breakage" cases and "generalized condition" cases-and two "exposure" categories-"freezing and sunstroke" cases and "diseases of exposure cases. In the category of exertion causing a "generalized condition" he places the heart injuries involving coronary thrombosis,
myocarditis, dilation of heart, arteriosclerosis, etc. A majority of
jurisdictions accept usual exertion as fulfilling the "by accident"

requirement if these conditions result. Larson lists Kentucky with the
majority in this category but indicates that heart cases are contra.3 '
In Kentucky cases, other than heart cases, internal injuries resulting

from strain have been recognized as being compensable "personal
injuries by accident" 32 and there has been no tendency to be so
meticulous with the question of trauma.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

and emotional upset, see also Masters, et. al., "Acute Coronary Insufficiency, Its
Differential Diagnosis and Treatment," 45 Annals Internal Medicine 561-581
(1956); Sigler, "The Evaluation of Claims for Workmen's Compensation in
Cardiac Disability and Death," 25 Industrial Medicine and Surgery 10 (Jan.
1956);
2 9 and Moritz, "Trauma and Heart Disease," 5 W. Res. L. Rev. 133 (1954).
"Distinguishing Between 'Natural and Traumatic' Death in Victims with
Pre-existing Severe Organic Disease," 6 Current Med. No. 23, p. 40 (Feb. 1959).
"The physician who is concerned with such a case may clarify the situation in his
mind if he states the problem in this fashion:
(1) Has the natural disease any connection with the trauma or is it a distinct
process?
(2) Is the natural disease sufficient to produce death by itself?
(3) Is the traumatic condition sufficient to produce death by itself?
(4) Is the natural disease merely a contributory factor in the death which is
due mainly to trauma?
(5) Is the traumatic condition merely a contributory factor to the death which
is due to natural causes?
(6) Is the death the result of traumatic injury and natural disease?"
30 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 11,
a) § 38.20 Routine exertion causing "breakage."

b) §

88.30 Routine exertion causing injury from "generalized conditions."

(c) § 38.40 Routine exposure causing
(d) § 38.50 Routine exposure causing
3l Id. § 88.30, at 527-528, n. 19.
32 Contractors Service & Supply Co.
Parrott v. S. A. Healy Co., 290 S.W. 2d

freezing or sunstrone.
disease.
v. Chism, 316 S.W. 2d 840 (Ky. 1958);
798 (Ky. 1956); Ironton Fire Brick Co.
(footnote continued on next page)

19611

NoTs

Unquestionably there is a distinct and peculiar test for compensation in heart cases in Kentucky. This may be the result of at least
two causes. 3 3 One cause is that lawyers, referees and the courts may
be unaware of the basic mechanics of heart injury. If this is the situation, a reliable evaluation of the issues of causal relationship is
impossible. There are a number of excellent sources through which
34
an attorney may acquire the knowledge necessary for his needs.
Secondly, physicians who offer testimony as expert witnesses frequently misunderstand their function. This is principally because they
are unaware of the legal determinants of compensability and the
degree of certainty required of their opinions. A mere "possibility"
is not alone sufficient to support a finding of fact.3

5

On the other

hand if the medical witness is cognizant of the significance attached
to the term "probable" as distinguished from the term "possible,"
very often it may be just a matter of words and he could reasonably
testify that the injury or condition is a "probable" result of a particular
accident. Also, it is not necessary for the medical witness to testify
with absolute certainty that a particular accident in fact caused or
aggravated the claimant's condition. The Board is entitled to take
all the circumstances into consideration, including medical testimony,
30
to justify its conclusion.
Doctors do not consider it important whether they say that a
heart condition was "aggravated"37 or "precipitated" by trauma, though
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

v. Madden, 285 S.W. 2d 897 (Ky. 1956); Totz Coal Co. v. Creech, 245 S.W. 2d
924 (Ky. 1951); U. S. Coal & Coke Co. v. Parsons, 245 S.W. 2d 442 (Ky. 1951);
Harlan-Wallins Coal Corp. v. Lawson, 242 S.W. 2d 999 (Ky. 1951); WoodMosaic Co. v. Shumate, 305 Ky. 368, 204 S.W. 2d 331 (1947); Tafel Electric Co.
v. Scherle, 295 Ky. 99, 173 S.W. 2d 810 (1943); and Coleman Mining Co. v.
Wicks, 213 Ky. 134, 280 S.W. 936 (1926).
33 See McLaughlin, "The Compensability of Heart Injuries Under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act," 21 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 445, 491 (1959-60).
Mr. McLaughlin, who was formerly Special Assistant Attorney General assigned to
the State's Workmen's Insurance Fund, cities in this article four principal causes
for what he terms "unfortunate results" in heart cases. The two causes discussed
in the text were among the four listed by Mr. McLaughlin.
84 See generally Boas, Cardiac Injury Resulting From Effort or Trauma
(1955); Practising Law Institute, Aggravation of Pre-existing Conditions-Medical
Aspects of Heart Injury Cases (1957); and Gray, Attorney's Textbook of Medicine
(8d ed. 1958), especially Vol. 1.
35 Old King Mining Co. v. Messer, 252 S.W. 2d 863 (Ky. 1952); Ratliff v.
Cubbage, 814 Ky. 716, 236 S.W. 2d 944 (1951); American Rolling Mill Co. v.
Pack, 0278 Ky. 175, 128 S.W. 2d 187 (1939).
3 SentilIes v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107 (1959), a case
under the Seamen's Welfare Act (Jones Act), 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §
688 (1960).
3
7 The Kentucky Court of Appeals seems to think in terms of "aggravation"
of pre-existing diseases. Terry v. Associated Stone Co. 334 S.W. 2d 926, 930
(Ky. 1960). Statutory provisions are: KRS 342.005(1) does not "include the
results of a pre-existing disease, whether previously disabling or not," under an
(footnote continued on next page)
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this is of concern to the lawyer. Supposedly, if "aggravation" is alleged
or required, this can be interpreted as implying, at the most, only a
"temporary enhancement" of pain and suffering from a cardiac condition which has in the past produced some degree of disability. On
the other hand, if "precipitation" is required or alleged, this would
seem to mean making a disease manifest, or bringing to light symptons
which were previously not present and which now make it difficult
for the individual to perform his normal activities or even to remain
alive. This distinction would, as far as traumatic heart conditions
are concerned, apparently make "precipitation" favorable to the plaintiff-claimant while "aggravation" would be more to the defendant's
advantage. 38
Regardless of whether the statute requires or there is an allegation
of "aggravation" or cprecipitation," the expert medical witness3" may
determine that the claimant was not previously suffering from a
disease if he had no symptoms which caused him pain, suffering, inconvenience or interference with his job. The question should be:
Was the specific accident or trauma (or could it have been) a competent producing cause of the subsequent symptoms of cardiac disability? This argument is especially supported by the physical
features of the heart that give this organ special reparative or healing
abilities by the process of compensation or decompensation. Many
people, as a result of this "compensation," never know of the disabling
symptoms of impaired coronary circulation until the traumatic accident
brings them to light. Also, in many of these cases but for the accident
the individual would have continued his normal functions-though
perhaps in a somewhat precarious state. Up until the actual time of
the accident the safety margin was adequate to permit his usual
activity. The unknown pre-existing cardiac condition merely rendered
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

employer's liability. Under KRS 342.005(2), apportionment of the aggregate extent and duration of disability must be made between:
(a) "Traumatic injury by accident;"
(b) Pre-existing disease previously disabling-

(c) Pre-existing disease not previously disabling but aroused into disabling
reality by the injury or occupational disease.

KRS 342.120(1)(a), (1)(b) and (4) (Ky. Acts 1960 ch. 147 § 9 then) indicates that a claimant may recover for a dormant non-disabling disease condition
which was aroused or brought into disabling reality by reason of a subsequent
compensable injury by accident or an occupational disease from the Subsequent
Claim Fund but not for prior disabling disease.
38 See "Procedural Problems in Proof of Traumatic Heart Disease: Important
Differences Between Allegation of 'Aggravation' and 'Precipitation'," 5 Current

Med. No. 20, p. 19 (May 1958), where this distinction is made.
39 In one case, at least, a general practitioner was held to be competent to
testify on the relationship between trauma and coronary heart disease. Choicener
v. Walters Amusement Agency, Inc., 269 Mass. 341, 168 N.E. 918 (1929).
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the claimant more susceptible or predisposed him to the effects of the
accidental injury. The accidental injury served to extinguish the
margin of safety.
In the past, the possibility of cardiac trauma from non-penetrating
injury to the chest was ignored by the medical profession. The stereotyped opinion was that the heart was an organ that almost always
escaped injury. Although the heart is well protected by the bony
thoracic cage, there is abundant evidence that cardiac injury does
result from either direct or indirect violence many times without
external evidence of injury and often from what appears to be only
slight trauma. At the present time more cases of traumatic heart
40
disease are overlooked than are diagnosed incorrectly.
Many medical authorities believe that even with the most severe
exertion it is impossible to cause a normal heart to fail or dilate. 41
Thus, where there is disability or death from heart disease following
exertion, there probably was a previous abnormal heart condition.
Therefore, any compensation award would be apportioned according
to the proximate contribution of the pre-existing disease and the
accident.4 2 Stern4" believed that a heart disorder could be aggravated
in three diflerent manners due to trauma: (1) by psychic excitement,
(2) by strong mechanical shock to the body, and (3) by strong
movements of the muscles, such as the effects of sudden effort. "Heart
strain is not trauma in the usual and common meaning of the word,
however, the result of this physiological condition is internal injury
with disability of varying duration and degree." 44 In the light of the
40

issane, "Injury and Heart Disease-Legal Aspects," 15 Ohio St. L.J. 409
(1954).
41Id. at 424. But see Adams v. Brant, 274 S.W. 2d 791 (Ky. 1955). Cf.
Boas Cardiac Injury Resulting From Effort or Trauma 3 (1955). Boas refers to
the following authorities: Uehlinger, E., Das Spontane Intramurale Hematom U.
Aneurysma Dissecans D. Normalen Coronararterie, 77 Schweiz. Med. Wchnschr
608 (1947); French and Dock, "Fatal Coronary Arteriosclerosis in Young
Soldiers," 124 J.A.M.A. 1283 (1944); Blumgart, "The Relation of Effort to
Attacks of Acute Myocardial Infarction," 128 J.A.M.A. 775 (1945); Moritz and
Zamcheck, "Sudden and Unexpected Deaths of Young Soldiers," 42 Arch. Path.
459 (1946).
2

4 KRS 342.005(2); Shuman Co. v. May, 327 S.W. 2d 14 (Ky. 1959);

American Rolling Mill Co. v. Stevens, 290 Ky. 16, 160 S.W. 2d 355 (1941);
University of Kentucky v. Combs, 261 Ky. 833, 88 S.W. 2d 981 (1935);
Broughton's Adm'r v. Congleton Lumber Co., 285 Ky. 534, 31 S.W. 2d 903
(1930); Kingston-Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Maynard, 209 Ky. 431, 273 S.W. 34
1925); B. F. Avery & Sons v. Carter, 205 Ky. 548, 266 S.W. 50 (1924); Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Gardner, 204 Ky. 216, 263 S.W. 743 (1924);
lobinson-Pettet Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Board, 201 Ky. 719, 258 S.W.
318 43
(1924).
Kissane, supra note 40 at 422, where he refers to the following authorities:
Stem, Uber Traumatische Entstehung Junerer Krankhuten, Jena p. 26 (1900);
Montsschr. f. Unfallheilkunde, p. 4 (1897); Dritte Auflage Bearbetet von Rudolf
Stem, Jena, p. 664 (1930).
441d. at 423.
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pathological processes that are associated with myocardial infarction
it is not unreasonable to assume that physical exertion can initiate a
myocardial infarction. 45 Physical strain, if it is to be regarded as the
cause of myocardial infarction will usually be a specific sudden effort
occurring at some particular moment, and be followed immediately
by symptoms of cardiac disturbances. 46 Even so, immediate disablement should not be an essential criterion of causal relationship, though
the onset of symptoms is important in determining whether the heart
disease is only coincidental with the injury or a result of the injury.
It is difficult to determine whether overexertion (or unusual exertion) should be necessary for compensation in heart cases. 47 For a
chronic cardiac cripple the slight normal exertion of every day life
may be enough to overstrain the diseased heart while another heart
may withstand tremendous exertion. A majority of jurisdictions hold
that if the strain of the employee's ordinary or usual exertions causes
death or collapse from heart weakness the injury is compensable,
although there is a rather substantial minority of jurisdictions that
require a showing that the exertion was in some way unusual or
extraordinary. 48 Kentucky's Court of Appeals has managed to avoid
any direct consideration of the unusual strain doctrine. Although the
court has discussed the element of "trauma" in heart cases, this discussion has been merely dictum.4 9 An able study has been made suggesting that Kentucky should resolve the question of causation in
heart cases by a determination whether the evidence reasonably
indicates a conclusion that the employment, in fact, caused the unexpected result for which compensation is sought and not by an "unusual
exertion" test.50 This is a reliable test and it would seem to be
designed to carry out the "intent of the legislature" underlying our
statute.
The term heart disease covers more than 20 different kinds of
45 Boas, op. cit. supra note 41, p. 2.
46 See Kissane, supra note 40 at 418 where it is stated, "Approximately
seventy-five per cent of all cases of traumatic heart disease have symptoms
immediately,
but there may be a delay up to one month."
47
Larson believes that many heart failure cases are decided on arbitrary

and artificial medico-legal distinctions which are rather dubious. 1 Larson, op. cit.
supra note 11, § 38.73 at 560. Larson further criticizes the whole theory of
unusualness
four grounds: (a) the word "accident" does not inherently require
"unexpected on
cause" which some states require for disease or generalized-condition
cases; (b) "unusual" is not synonymous with "unexpected" or "accidental"; (c)
there is seldom any adequate measure of the unusualness or usualness of exertion
in any occupation; and (d) unusual exertion does not necessarily indicate a
greater possibility of medical causation. Id. at §§ 38.60-38.63, 38.81.
48 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 11, § 38.30. For a minority tabulation, see

Note, "Workmen's Compensation-Heart Cases- Possible Demise of the 'Unusual
Strain' Test," 47 Ky. L.J. 451, n. 4 (1959).
49 Id.47 Ky. L.J. at 453, n. 8.
SOId. at 455.
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Of these, the big three-arteriosclerosis (coronary artery

disease), hypertension and rheumatic heart disease-account for about
96 per cent of the disabilities and deaths.5 2 Arteriosclerotic heart
disease (including coronary artery disease) accounts for a large
majority of all "heart disease" deaths-for more than four-fifths of the
total among white males and for nearly two-thirds of those among
white females. 3 This discussion is limited to disabilities or deaths
resulting from coronary arteriosclerosis as this is the heart disease
most easily affected by stress and strain or exertion. Heart failure
in persons with "uncomplicated" hypertensive heart is normally a
result of a slowly progressive deterioration and the course of the
disease is rarely significantly changed by physical exertion or emotional
disturbance. 4 This would mean that hypertensive heart disease, if
not complicated by coronary arteriosclerosis, would be compensable
only where heart disease is recognized as an occupational disease. 55
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has not had occasion to pass upon
this point and it is not considered practicable to make this extension
at the present time.
Up to this point the argument has been that heart cases should
be compensable but not all heart or cardiac cases will be or should
be compensable. A reasonable question at this point would be: Are
there any criteria by which a compensable cardiac case can be
distinguished from a non-compensable cardiac case? Obviously this
can not be stated in an all-inclusive test. As a skeleton foundation or
as a minimum basis, the following checklist may be used for traumatic
heart cases: 6
51
See "Prior Cardiac Conditions Aggravated by Trauma," 1 Current Med.
No. 2, pp. 36-37 (Nov. 1953), for seven (7) types of prior heart disease that may
be aggravated
by trauma.
52
Your Heart, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Bulletin, p. 10 (1954);
see also
53 note 9 supra.
Statistical Bulletin, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, p. 1 (Feb.
1959); supra note 9 at 6. Hypertension was reported as an associated condition
in a considerable proportion of deaths classified as due to arteriosclerotic heart
disease; when both of these conditions are reported on the death certificate,
international rules of classification require that the death be charged to
arteriosclerotic heart disease.
54 Moritz, "Trauma and Heart Disease," 5 W. Res. L. Rev. 133 at 139 (1954).
The tenor of this article indicates that Dr. Moritz thinks of heart failure as the
end result and not the proressive process.
55 Cf., Insurance Dep t of Mississippi v. Dinsmore, 283 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d
691 (1958), where compensation was awarded when mental and nervous strain
of work was a "factor" contributing to death from a stroke. Discussed in 37
Texas L. Rev. 258 (1958), and 27 Fordham L. Rev. 462 (1958). Kentucky's
general occupational disease statute was not enacted until 1956. KRS 342.316
(Ky. 5Acts 1956, ch. 77 §12).
"Functional Capacity and Therapeutic Classification" from Nomenclature
and Criteria for Diagnosis of Diseases of the Heart, New York Heart Association
(1939), adopted by the American Heart Association, 5 Current Med. No. 20, p.
23 (May 1958).
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A. Proximate Causation

1. What was the nature of the injury? (Automobile collision, fall
on stairs, violent physical exertion, emotional stress, etc.)
2. Was the claimant unconscious or in shock for any period of time?
How long was he unconscious?
3. Did the claimant exhibit at the time of the injury any evidence
of emotional upset, anxiety, hysteria, or tension?
4. At the time of the injury, was there any necessity for the
administration of emergency cardiac drugs (such as morphine,
demerol, aminophyllin derivatives)?
5. Did the claimant faint at the time of the injury?
6. Before the accident did the claimant have a history of: rheumatism, chorea, scarlet fever, congenital heart disease, arteriosclerotic or coronary heart disease?
7. Before the accident did the claimant have any symptoms of:
Pain in the chest, shortness of breath, palpitation, rapid heart
beat, swelling of the ankles, easy fatigability?
B. Identification
1. After the accident did the claimant exhibit any symptoms such
as: Chest pain, shortness of breath, palpitation, rapid heart
beat, swelling of the ankles, easy fatigability?
2. What did the electrocardiogram show after the accident?
8. If electrocardiograms were taken before the accident and are
available, how do they compare with those made after the
accident?
4. Are there any murmurs present?
5. What significance do these murmurs have from a functional or
disability viewpoint?
6. After exercise, is there any evidence of blueness of the skin
(cyanosis) or shortness of breath (dyspnea)?
7. What is the blood pressure (both systolic and diastolic)immediately after exercise and three minutes after exercise?
8. Is there any irregularity of pulse after exercise?
9. Does the pulse rate return to normal limits within a reasonable
time after exercise?
10. Is the "cardiac reserve"-good? fair? poor?
11. Is the heart disease "fully compensated?"
12. What drugs are being given for treatment of this heart condition?
13. What is the exact medical diagnosis?
C. Evaluation of Disability
1. Is this claimant employable (a) full time? (b) part time? (c)
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only for light duty or sedentary positions? (d) moderate duty
positions? (e) arduous duty positions?

2. What is his "functional capacity class?"
(a) Class 1-Is there no limitation of his physical activities in
spite of the fact that he has heart disease? That is, does
ordinary physical activity cause him no discomfort? Claimants in this class do not have any symptoms of cardiac
insufficiency nor do they experience angina.
(b) Class 2-Is he a claimant with cardiac disease who has only
a slight limitation of physical activities? That is, is he comfortable only at rest? In this class, ordinary physical
activity results in undue fatigue, palpitation of the heart,
shortness of breath.
(c) Class 3-Is he a claimant who has marked limitation of
physical activity-by reason of the fact that even "less than
ordinary" activity causes undue fatigue, palpitation of the
heart, shortness of breath or anginal pain?
(d) Class 4-Is he a claimant with heart disease who is unable
to carry on any physical activities whatsoever without discomfort? Even at rest in bed or in a chair, does he exhibit
symptoms such as those mentioned above? Does he, when
any physical activity whatsoever is undertaken, increase or
enhance existing discomfort?
8. "Therapeutic classification"-In what therapeutic classification
has the claimant been put by his doctor? In this regard there
are the following therapeutic classifications:
(a) Class 1-Claimants with heart disease whose physical
activity need not be restricted.
(b) Class 2-Claimants with heart disease whose ordinary physical activity need not be restricted-but who cannot undertake, or who are advised not to undertake unusually severe
or competitive efforts.
(c) Class 3-Claimants with heart disease whose ordinary physical activity has to be moderately restricted, and whose
strenuous physical activity has to be discontinued.
(d) Class 4-Claimants with heart disease whose ordinary physical activity has to be markedly restricted.
(e) Class 5-Claimants with heart disease who have to be at
complete rest in a bed (or a wheelchair).
This therapeutic classification was adopted as a guide for the doctor
in the management or treatment of cardiacs. However, the attorney
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may find it useful as an aid in determining causation and in evaluation
of disability in cases of cardiac disturbance after trauma.
CONCLUSION
It should not be a sufficient defense to say that the underlying
process, even though not producing any symptoms or disability, can,
by its inherent development and without the intervention of trauma,
produce disability. The question to be posed and settled is whether
the specific trauma, when it occurred, was an efficient producing
cause for the ensuing symptoms and the disability. The fact that
without trauma the underlying diseased condition is capable of
eventuating and indeed may eventuate into disability is not relevant
to the fact that because of trauma it did result in the disability complained of at a particular time.
A unique criterion should not be required for compensation in
heart cases in Kentucky. To prevent discrimination against cardiac
injury claimants as compared with claimants from other industrial
injuries, Kentucky should not retreat from its position in Terry v.
Associated Stone Co.5 7 This liberal view or position is in keeping with
the spirit of our Workmen's Compensation Act.
The test to be used by the court if it is to maintain this position
should be whether there is evidence to support a conclusion that the
employment, in fact, caused the unexpected result for which compensation is sought regardless of the degree of strain. Over exertion should
not be an absolute essential for an award. It might be advantageous,
in order to resolve the question of causation in keeping with the
"intent of the legislature", to avoid the attempt to distinguish between
"exertion" and "overexertion" and to use the compound term "stress
and strain" 58 instead. The compound term would include both usual
exertion and overexertion.
In making the investigation and determination whether the employment in fact caused the unexpected result, the use of a board of impartial cardiologists responsible only to the Workmen's Compensation
Board would be the ideal modus operandi.59 The employee would be
57

Terry v. Associated Stone Co., 334 S.W. 2d 926 (Ky. 1960).

8"xertion" and "overexertion" seem to be the words that have been

adopted by the legal profession and use of them may lead to distinctions not
advocated by this article. "Stress and strain" appear more frequently in medical
discussions without any attempt to distinguish between the usual and the unusual. See, e.g., Rosenbaum and Belknap, Work and The Heart (1959); Stroud
and Stroud, Diagnosis and Treatment of Cardiovascular Disease (1957). At least
one court has used the term "stress and strain, see McMurray's Case, 116 N.E.
2d 847 (Mass. 1954).
59 This can be done under KRS 342.315. This statute permits "physicians or
surgeons." See also KRS 342.121.
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adequately protected with this method. With the aid of the cardiologists the Board should have little difficulty with the problem of
apportionment which is present in most heart injury cases.
The employer will be adequately protected in Kentucky by our
"subsequent injury" statute. 60 This statute was designed to promote
employment of handicapped persons and older workers. Because of
this statute, fear of possible future awards in cardiac injury cases
should not create any reluctance on the part of employers to employ
or re-employ these people.
Adoption of this view in Kentucky will not open the floodgates
with every internal failure becoming an accident just because it
happens as was prophesied by Judge Latimer in his dissent in the
Purity Biscuit Company case.61 The effect of the test advocated will
be to make the question of compensability turn on the fundamental
causation issue. There must still be an "accident" involving an unexpected result 62 and some effort or exertion medically capable of producing the collapse "arising out of" and "in the course of" his employment.
It is not enough that the cardiac failure merely happen during working
hours.03 The controlling factors in considering cardiac injury cases
should be prevention of arbitrary discrimination against employees
injured in this manner and imposition on industry (as part of cost of
production) with the cost of work-connected injuries in our industrial
society. Sound legal principles to distinguish the compensable from
the non-compensable cardiac claim are essential to preclude a sort of
macabre industrial raffle in which a cardiac victim's chances of recovery are practically nihil.
Thomas L. Jones
60 KRS 342.120.
61 Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Ut. 1, 201 P. 2d 961 at 975

(1949).2

6 Totz Coal Co. v. Creech, 245 S.W. 2d 924 (Ky. 1951); Phil Hollenbach
Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S.W. 152 (1918), defining "accident" as
something "unusual, unexpected, and undesigned," including an "unexpected or
unusual event happening with or without negligence." See generally I Larson,
op. cit. supra note 11, § 37.20.
63 Masonic Widows & Orphans Home v. Lewis, 330 S.W. 2d 103 (Ky. 1959);
United States Steel Co. v. Isbell, 275 S.W. 2d 917 (Ky. 1955); Harlan-WaIlins
Coal Corp. v. Stewart, 275 S.W. 2d 912 (Ky. 1955); Draper v. Ry. Accessories
Co., 300 Ky. 597, 189 S.W. 2d 934 (1945). See 1 Larson, op cit. supra note 11,
§38.83 at 564.565 for view similar to the one expressed in this paragraph,

